With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, so too has talk of US-North Korea relations. President Trump’s first term began with incendiary confrontations with North Korea: notably, he threatened “fire and fury” against the nation, which, in response, called one of Trump’s statements “a declaration of war.” Surprisingly, though, relations between the two countries improved drastically in just a few years, with leaders holding negotiations at summits in Singapore and Hanoi, and Trump would eventually become the first sitting president to cross the Demilitarized Zone into North Korea.
However, these negotiations led only to a deal consisting of vague goals, with no material successes or concrete timelines.
After the Biden administration’s attempt to re-establish contact failed, perhaps because of North Korea’s total shutdown beginning in 2020, relations between the two countries took a back seat in the Biden administration’s priorities.
This brings us to Trump’s second term: just two weeks after his inauguration, he stated, “we will have relations with North Korea.” Kim Jong-Un’s comments following this statement were discouraging, calling Trump a “ferocious robber,” but much greater confrontations in Trump’s first term only led to unprecedented negotiations. If the first 4 years of the Trump administration are anything to go by, a much more significant deal with North Korea is likely to come in the near future.
The Korean war and its aftermath crippled North Korea with near-universal international sanctions, severely limiting its ability to trade with other countries or receive development aid. The only reasons North Korea is still standing today are international crime and unlawful trade with China and Russia. But these have only brought in the bare minimum required to keep the regime from collapsing.
Kim Jong Un, who has served as North Korea’s leader following his father’s death in 2011, however, has placed more importance on the country’s economic development than his father and grandfather before him. In early 2022, Kim pledged to solve the country’s chronic food shortage. In early 2024, he vowed to rebuild the country’s industrial capability, with new factories in 20 counties each year. Although many people may question the feasibility and likelihood of these commitments, Kim’s sustained push to reach a deal with the U.S. and South Korea during the first Trump administration paints a different picture.
But Kim cannot attain these goals if the harsh Cold War-era U.S. sanctions, which affect around 80% of all goods North Korea could otherwise export, are not lifted.
Historically, North Korea has only sought minor concessions, achieved through temporary halts of military programs (such as the 2005 nuclear testing pause exchanged for energy assistance to the country), but if Kim wants to achieve his ambitious economic goals, he has to go further than simply bullying larger powers for minimal aid. Instead, he must make notable and permanent concessions to the U.S., such as substantially scaling back its own nuclear program, in exchange for equally substantial relief from U.S. sanctions.
Kim is not irrational. Trump’s first term prioritized North Korean relations more than any previous administration. Kim should understand that if a realistic and substantive deal between the U.S. and North Korea is to be reached at all, it will have to be reached in the next four years. Any later, and the issue is likely to fall back to the wayside, where it has been for so many past administrations.
Part of the difficulty in reaching a deal with North Korea is the stake that South Korea has in all of this. South Korea has built the fifth strongest military in the world, and it has done so primarily as a defense mechanism against the North. In previous negotiations, North Korea has often asked for a reduction of the South Korean military presence; South Korea’s strong military is problematic in the eyes of the North Korean government, paranoid of a southern invasion, and weakening that military is also a problem for South Korea, paranoid of a northern invasion.
If a concrete deal is to be reached with North Korea, the U.S. needs to take a leading role in any potential negotiations to overcome the impasse. Complete denuclearization may be a far-off, unlikely goal, but a comprehensive deal can still pave the way to a much friendlier and more productive relationship with North Korea.
